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THE CARNEGIE EFFECT: ELEVATING 
PRACTICAL TRAINING OVER LIBERAL 
EDUCATION IN CURRICULAR REFORM 
Mark Yates* 
The Carnegie Foundation issued its book-length report, Edu-
cating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law (Carnegie 
Report) in 2007.1  Although there have been numerous responses 
to it, relatively few have engaged it with any degree of critical 
analysis.2  Law schools across the country have enthusiastically 
mentioned the Carnegie Report in connection with curricular 
changes intended to “prepare” students, in the words of the Re-
port, for the practice of law.3  Mostly these changes amount to 
adding clinical options or even clinical requirements, adding units 
to legal writing programs, and updating professional responsibil-
ity courses.  Very few, if any law schools, however, have publicly 
considered the full implications of what it means to be “prepared” 
for the practice of law, or what the Report meant by that term.  
For the most part, the legal education community has assumed 
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 1. William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of 
Law (Jossey-Bass 2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report]. 
 2. Critical responses include the following: Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 
Mich. L. Rev. 1073 (2009) (criticizing Carnegie Report for overlooking alternative theoreti-
cal frameworks); Joseph A. Dickinson, Understanding the Socratic Method in Law School 
Teaching after the Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers, 31 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 97 
(2009) (criticizing Carnegie Report for its treatment of the Socratic method); Leonard J. 
Long, Resisting Anti-intellectualism and Promoting Legal Literacy, 34 S. Ill. U. L.J. 1, 20 
(2009) (criticizing Carnegie Report being anti-intellectual).  See also Toni M. Fine, Reflec-
tions on U.S. Law Curricular Reform, 10 German L.J. 717 (2009); Jess M. Krannich et al., 
Beyond “Thinking Like a Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward a Compre-
hensive View of Legal Education, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 381 (2009); Patrick E. Longan, 
Teaching Professionalism, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 659 (2009); James R. Maxeiner, Educating 
Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method, 
35 Intl. J. Leg. Info. 1 (2007). 
 3. Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 1, 22; Karen Sloan, Reality’s Knocking: The Reces-
sion Is Forcing Schools to Bow to Reality, Recorder 1, 10 (Sept. 9, 2009). 
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this simply means more training in practical skills.4  For the Re-
port, however, being prepared for the practice of law means much 
more.  As I will discuss in this Article, the Report’s primary ar-
gument is that traditional legal pedagogy has overemphasized 
legal theory and underemphasized practical skills and develop-
ment.  By focusing on theory in the abstract setting of the class-
room, the Report argues, traditional legal education undermines 
the ethical foundations of law students and thus fails to prepare 
them for the practice of law in not only the practical sense but 
also in the ethical sense.  The Report, therefore, calls for law 
schools not simply to produce better-skilled practitioners, but ra-
ther to infuse lawyers with a highly developed sense of moral and 
ethical identity, which will then lead to a reform of the profession 
itself.   
As I will discuss below, however, even if one accepts the Car-
negie Report’s vision of professional identity, it is not at all clear 
that reforming legal education, by itself, will have a significant 
impact on the profession as a whole.  In this Article I will argue 
that, even if legal educators wish to embrace a more progressive 
vision of the profession, and even if we agree that legal education 
should take the lead in bringing it about, the Carnegie Report’s 
perspective is far too narrow.  Specifically, the Report failed to 
consider whether the erosion of professional ethics is symptomatic 
both of a much broader trend in higher education as a whole and 
of significant changes in the profession itself. 
I. THE CARNEGIE REPORT ON LEGAL EDUCATION 
The Report’s central conclusion is that, although traditional 
legal pedagogy is very effective in certain aspects, it overempha-
sizes legal theory and underemphasizes practical skills and pro-
fessional development.5  By focusing on theory in the abstract set-
ting of the classroom, the Report argues, traditional legal educa-
tion undermines the ethical foundations of law students and fails 
to prepare them adequately for actual practice.6  Traditional legal 
  
 4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Not Clinical Education? 16 Clin. L. Rev. 35 (2009); Leah 
M. Christensen, The Power of Skills: An Empirical Study of Lawyering Skills Graded as 
the Strongest Predictor of Law School Success, 83 St. John’s L. Rev. 795 (2009). 
 5. Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 24 
 6. Id. 
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education is effective in teaching students to “think like lawyers,” 
but needs significant improvement in teaching them to function 
as ethical and responsible professionals after law school.7  As I 
will discuss in greater detail below, in general, the Report recom-
mends “contextualizing” and “humanizing” legal education by in-
tegrating clinical and professional responsibility courses into the 
traditional core curriculum.8  In this way, students will learn to 
think like lawyers in the concrete setting of actual cases and cli-
ents.9  The Report refers to pedagogical theories developed in oth-
er educational settings and argues that these theories show that 
teaching legal theory in the context of practice will not only better 
prepare students to be lawyers, it will also foster development of a 
greater and more deeply felt sense of ethical and professional 
identity.10 
The first chapter of the Report focuses on a survey of typical 
law school first-year programs, contrasting the traditional ap-
proach with two law schools that have implemented more innova-
tive curricula.  The study identifies and describes the “signature 
pedagogy” of legal education, analogizing it with a concept bor-
rowed from linguistics.11  Like language, the authors explain, the 
signature pedagogy of law school has four “structures”: a “surface 
structure,” a “deep structure,” a “tacit structure,” and a “shadow 
structure.”12  The “surface structure” is the most obvious and ob-
servable aspect of the Socratic Method—the instructor calls on 
students and leads them through the intricacies of a case by ask-
ing a series of questions.13  The “deep structure” is the purpose 
behind the Socratic Method—teaching students to “think like a 
lawyer.”14  The “tacit structure” is that a student’s personal sense 
of morality is not necessarily relevant to resolving legal prob-
lems.15  Finally, “the shadow structure” is the absent or weakly 
developed part of legal education, which is clinical training.16  The 
  
 7. Id. at 29–33. 
 8. Id. at 115–122. 
 9. Id. at 79. 
 10. Id. at 79–81. 
 11. Id. at 23. 
 12. Id. at 24. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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weakness in legal education, according to the Report, occurs pri-
marily in the tacit and shadow structures.17 
Having described the traditional approach to legal education, 
the Report then examines legal education in the context of profes-
sional education as a whole, using the concept of apprenticeship 
as a metaphor for the three dimensions of professional educa-
tion.18  Students in professional schools are taught on three di-
mensions, namely thinking, behaving, and performing.  Each of 
these dimensions is described in the Report as an “apprentice-
ship.”19  During the first apprenticeship, students are taught a 
specific form of reasoning through the Socratic Method.20  In the 
second apprenticeship, students learn the actual practice of law 
through simulation and clinical courses.21  In the third, students 
develop a sense of professional identity.22 
By using the metaphor of apprenticeship, the Report empha-
sizes that professional education is a formative experience and 
should therefore focus expressly—not just “tacitly”—on develop-
ing a law student’s sense of professional identity grounded in eth-
ics.  Reforming legal education is intended to facilitate reform in 
the legal profession as a whole because “[f]or professional educa-
tion, the question is how to provide a powerful experience of the 
best sense of what it means to take up a profession.”23 
Thus, the Report reasons, “professional education is . . . in-
herently ethical education in the deep and broad sense.”24  And 
therefore fostering a sense of ethical identity literally means fos-
tering moral identity: “The moral development of professionals 
requires a holistic approach to the educational experience that 
can grasp its formative effects as a whole.”25 
Chapter Two of the Report focuses on the strengths and 
weaknesses of legal education’s “signature pedagogy,” which is 
the “case-dialogue method.”26  Using the archetypal fictional ex-
  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 27–29. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 28. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 30. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 31. 
 26. Id. at 50–51. 
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change between a frightened first-year law student and the noto-
riously intimidating professor dramatized in The Paper Chase as 
metaphor, the Report analyzes case dialogue teaching in terms of 
the “four dimensions” of pedagogy outlined in the first chapter.27  
The “surface structure” is the exchange between professor and 
student, but the “deep structure,” the purpose behind the method, 
is less obvious.28  At its core, the underlying rationale for the case-
dialogue method is teaching students to “think like a lawyer,” but, 
in the process of learning a new approach to reasoning, students 
are led to focus only on facts that are relevant to the abstract le-
gal principles on which the case turns.29  Thus, according to the 
Report, the link between the “surface structure” of the case-
dialogue approach and its “deep structure” is that students, over 
the course of the first semester, if not the whole year, learn to re-
frame human conflict through the lens of legal principles and to 
redefine the human actors according to their posture as plaintiff 
or defendant in a given case.30  This represents the third dimen-
sion, the “tacit structure.”  Students are therefore encouraged 
through modeling and repetition to distance themselves from the 
human stories behind the cases they study.31  They learn to see 
human actors and conflict in the purely abstract setting of the 
classroom, divorced from the “real world” context that gave rise to 
the disputes that are at the heart of the cases they study.32   
The Report acknowledges that the case-dialogue method is 
very effective in teaching legal reasoning, but it identifies two 
missing components, which are therefore part of the “shadow 
structure” of first-year instruction.  First, the abstract setting of 
the classroom teaches legal reasoning by focusing exclusively on 
cases without exposure to actual clients, which, leads to the se-
cond missing component, instruction without “ethical sub-
stance.”33  To function effectively in the case-dialogue approach, 
students are often forced to separate their personal sense of fair-
ness and justice from their understanding of legal rules and prin-
  
 27. Id. at 48. 
 28. Id. at 51. 
 29. Id. at 53. 
 30. Id. at 53–54. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 54–55. 
 33. Id. at 56–57. 
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ciples.34  In other words, exclusive reliance on the case-dialogue 
method fragments legal education.35  Traditional legal education, 
therefore, emphasizes the abstract and technical aspect of legal 
practice at the expense of a more holistic vision of the attorney as 
both private advocate and social regulator.36   
Here again, the Report’s critique of legal education is also a 
critique of the profession itself.  According to the Report, Ameri-
can lawyers serve both private and public functions.  In their pub-
lic role, attorneys have an obligation as stewards of the legal sys-
tem as a whole.37  This public stewardship is what the Report 
calls “civic professionalism.”38  At the same time, however, “law-
yers are themselves social actors, functioning within rather than 
above the perpetual clash” of interests.39  This private-interest 
role represents the more familiar view of lawyers as zealous advo-
cates for their clients.40  The case-dialogue method, the Report 
argues, serves to prepare students for their role as private-
interest advocates, which is only one side of their dual roles.  Stu-
dents are taught to be “legal technicians,” with very little empha-
sis, at least during the first year, on the social and ethical ideals 
of the profession in its public role: “the first-year experience as a 
whole, without conscious and systematic efforts at counterbal-
ance, tips the scales . . . away from cultivating the humanity of 
the student and toward the student’s re-engineering into a ‘legal 
machine.’”41   
In Chapter Three, the Report shifts its focus from critique to 
a discussion of specific recommendations for bridging the gap be-
tween theory and practice.  Returning to the metaphor of the 
“three apprenticeships,” the Report argues that transition be-
tween the three is not a strictly linear process.  Rather it is a dia-
lectic, or as the Report puts it, an “iterative” process in which each 
of the three apprenticeships is informed by the others.42  All three 
  
 34. Id. at 57. 
 35. Id. at 81. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. at 82. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 84. 
 42. Id. at 98. 
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should be present and identified from the beginning.43  The three 
apprenticeships, taken together, create a kind of synergy.  Theory 
and practice inform each other so that engagement in solving ac-
tual legal problems will bring theory and practice together in a 
client-centered approach.44  The Report refers to this holistic pro-
cess as teaching case theory: “case theory calls attention to the 
important role played by the problems of particular clients in spe-
cific situations in giving impetus to the legal process.”45   
“In actual practice,” the Report continues, “the parts are not 
attended to all at once or even sequentially in a once-and-for-all 
sense but iteratively, in a virtuous circle.”46  “Each of the elements 
should be present from the beginning” of a student’s develop-
ment.47  To achieve this process of integration, the Report recom-
mends three specific reforms.48  First, writing and research clas-
ses taught during the first year should play a greater role in the 
overall curriculum.49  Writing classes are well suited to the pro-
cess of integration because they involve simulated practice, stu-
dents get extensive feedback, and, in the best classes, writing 
pedagogy incorporates modern learning theory.50  Second, classes 
in negotiation should also assume a more prominent role.51  Nego-
tiation involves problem solving in a non-adversarial context and 
thus including it as a central component of legal education rein-
forces a broader concept of the practice of law that goes beyond 
the traditional notion of the lawyer as zealous advocate in a pure-
ly adversarial system.52  Finally, the Report calls for development 
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a new science, distinct 
from negotiation.53 
  
 43. Id. at 124. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally id. at 104–111. 
 50. Id. at 107. 
 51. Id. at 111. 
 52. “[N]egotiation has raised its status through generating new legal theory.  This 
development has been broadly linked to law firms’ promotion of innovative legal services, 
which also expands the range of roles for lawyers.”  Id. at 113. 
 53. Although attitudes toward including ADR as a central part of legal education are 
changing, law schools have traditionally resisted teaching the topic as a distinct theory: 
“[m]ediation and other alternatives to adjudication . . . were less easily confined to legal 
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The Report’s fourth chapter focuses on the “apprenticeship of 
professional identity,” and here the Report makes explicit that its 
critique of legal education is also a critique of legal practice. The 
Report argues that, especially at a time of professional disorienta-
tion, law schools can help strengthen the profession’s legitimacy 
by finding new ways to advance its enduring commitments to so-
ciety as a whole.54  Thus, the Report describes a lawyer’s identity 
not just in the traditional terms of being an advocate with an ab-
solute fidelity to a client’s interests, but also puts forth the alter-
nate and a potentially controversial view that a lawyer’s profes-
sional identity should be defined by a higher purpose than mere 
advocacy.  An attorney ought to follow a course of action that 
would promote justice in a “broader sense.”55  In order to prepare 
future lawyers for this broader role, the Report argues that law 
schools should teach morality as a central element of legal educa-
tion.56  
The Report acknowledges two possible objections to teaching 
moral or ethical conduct in professional education.  First, the Re-
port considers whether it is possible for graduate-level education 
to have a significant impact on the ethical and moral character of 
its students, and second, the Report examines faculty objections 
that moral education amounts to indoctrination of purely subjec-
tive points of view.  At first glance, the Report concedes that the 
available research suggests that professional education has no 
significant effect on the ethical or moral development of its stu-
dents.57  The Report cites various studies that show no significant 
change in “moral thinking” between students entering law school 
and practitioners.58  However, the Report notes that although the 
  
professionals and tended to shade off into quasi-legal, ‘lay’ activities, as exemplified by the 
successful dissemination of some of these ideas in popular literature—a problem of blurred 
professional boundaries that continues to hobble the full acceptance of ADR as a profes-
sional specialty.”  Id. at 114. 
 54. Id. at 128. 
 55. Id. at 131. 
 56. Id. at 133. This subject has generated a body of scholarship including the follow-
ing: James D. Gordon, Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, Values, and Professionalism, 59 
J. Leg. Educ. 151 (2009); Joshua J. A. Henderson, The Ethical Development of Law Stu-
dents: An Empirical Study, 72 Sask. L. Rev. 75 (2009); Nelson Miller & Victoria Kremski, 
Who Is the Customer and What Are We Selling?  Employer-Based Objectives for the Ethical 
Competence of Law School Graduates, 33 J. Leg. Prof. 223 (2009). 
 57. Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 133. 
 58. Id. 
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data measures the degree of actual change, it does not indicate 
that there is no potential for change.  In other words, the research 
does not show a “ceiling effect” on moral development.59  Further, 
other research indicates that “moral identity,” as opposed to 
“moral thinking,” can continue to develop well into adulthood.60  
Thus, the Report concludes, the research overall indicates that 
graduate-level education can have an impact on the ethical devel-
opment of its students. 
Even if one accepts the possibility of impacting a law stu-
dent’s ethical development, however, the question remains of how 
to teach—or even whether to teach—a particular set of values.  As 
the Report acknowledges, many law school faculty “equate efforts 
to support students’ ethical development with inculcation, which 
they see as illegitimate and ineffective.”61  According to this view, 
law school instruction, rather than teaching adult students what 
their values should be, should encourage students to bring their 
own sense of morality (whatever that might be) to legal education 
and practice.62   
The Report notes, however, that faculty skepticism about 
teaching values is at least partially inconsistent with the view 
urged by the American Bar Association.63  Since the 1990s, the 
ABA has argued that one required class on legal ethics is not suf-
ficient and has called for law schools to develop a more thorough 
focus on professional responsibility.64  The Report also cites the 
MacCrate Report, which, in 1992, called for legal education to 
“promote justice, fairness, and morality.”65  A 1996 report from 
the Professionalism Committee of the American Bar Association 
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar found a 
decline in lawyer professionalism and called for significant reform 
in teaching professional responsibility and ideals.66  Finally, the 
Report notes that many legal commentators have identified a  
  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 135. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 136. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (quoting Sec. of Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Legal Education and Professional 
Development—An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and 
the Profession: Narrowing the Gap 140–141 (ABA 1992)). 
 66. Id. (citing Sec. of Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Teaching and Learning Professional-
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“crisis of professionalism” . . . manifest in a decline of civility 
and an increase in adversarialism, a decline in role of the 
counselor and in lawyers’ competence, including ethical 
competence, and a new sense of the law as a business, sub-
ject to greater competitive economic pressures and answera-
ble only to the bottom line.67 
Thus, the Report argues that legal education not only can affect 
the moral identity of students it inevitably will have such an ef-
fect.68   
The Report concludes, therefore, that if legal educators 
acknowledge, as they must, the formative dimension of legal edu-
cation, they should take a more active role in modeling a particu-
lar set of values that are central to the practice of law:  
Insofar as law schools choose not to place ethical-social val-
ues within the inner circle of their highest esteem and most 
central pre-occupation, and insofar as they fail to make sys-
tematic efforts to educate toward a central moral tradition of 
lawyering, legal education may inadvertently contribute to 
the demoralization of the legal profession and its loss of a 
moral compass, as many observers have charged.69  
II. BEFORE LAW SCHOOL: THE DEMISE OF LIBERAL ARTS 
EDUCATION IN UNDERGRADUATE INSTITUTIONS 
Although the Report calls for reforms in legal education to re-
spond to what its authors see as a crisis in the legal profession, 
the Report does not discuss at length the factors that led to that 
crisis.  In particular, the Report’s discussion of the ethical devel-
opment of students in law school does not consider whether or 
how students’ experience before law school, at the undergraduate 
level, may affect the way students respond to legal education and 
ultimately how they practice as lawyers.  This part discusses how 
undergraduate education has changed significantly in the last 
thirty years and how these changes have impacted student expec-
tations of education in general.          
  
ism: Report of the Professionalism Committee 5 (ABA 1996)). 
 67. Id. at 136–137. 
 68. Id. at 139. 
 69. Id. at 140. 
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Since the 1970s, undergraduate institutions in the United 
States have been shifting their curricular emphasis from liberal 
arts to more professionally oriented education.70  This shift is due 
largely to enrollment concerns caused by changes in the labor 
market and corresponding changes in the expectations of entering 
students.71  Furthermore, the shift from liberal arts education to a 
more utilitarian approach appears to relate directly to social sta-
tus.72  The change has been less pronounced in prestigious insti-
tutions for which declining enrollment has been of less concern, 
while it has been particularly strong in institutions that admit a 
large proportion of students with low test scores.73  But even pri-
vate liberal arts colleges have not been immune.  For example, a 
study conducted in the 1990s found that, of the 540 colleges de-
fined by the Carnegie Foundation as liberal arts colleges, most 
had in fact become “small professional institutions with a liberal 
arts tradition.”74  Among second-tier public institutions, almost 
none have retained a liberal arts focus.75 
The evolution of undergraduate education from liberal arts to 
vocational training appears to have had a significant impact of 
the moral and ethical development of college students.  One 
study, for example, compared student responses in the 1990s with 
similar responses from the late 1960s and found a sharp decline 
in awareness of different philosophies and cultures, science, liter-
ature, and arts, and, most importantly, in the awareness of per-
sonal development.76  Another study found a profound shift from 
the 1960s to the late 1980s in student expectations of college edu-
cation.77  Students “interested in attending college to develop a 
‘meaningful philosophy of life’ declined by 45” percent during that 
period, while those who entered college for purely financial rea-
  
 70. Michael Delucchi, “Liberal Arts” Colleges and the Myth of Uniqueness, 68 J. Higher 
Educ. 414, 414 (July/Aug. 1997). 
 71. Id.  
 72. Steven Brint et al., From the Liberal Arts to the Practical Arts in American Colleg-
es and Universities: Organizational Analysis and Curricular Change, 76 J. Higher Educ. 
151, 173 (Mar./Apr. 2005). 
 73. Id. 
 74. W. Norton Grubb & Marvin Lazerson, Vocationalism in Higher Education: The 
Triumph of the Education Gospel, 76 J. Higher Educ. 1, 8 (Jan./Feb. 2005) (quoting D. 
Breneman). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Brint et al., supra n. 72, at 152. 
 77. Grubb & Lazerson, supra n. 74, at 6–7. 
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sons grew by 40 percent.78  These studies reflect a significant 
change in how students view the purpose of education generally.  
Education is seen less as a function of self-development and more 
and more as simply a means to an end, which, for the most part, 
is enhancing earning potential.  “The simple fact is,” one author 
writes, “that civic, intellectual, and moral purposes are not what 
most students think higher education is about.”79  If we accept the 
Report’s view that legal education should focus more on fostering 
the ethical development of law students, the devolution of under-
graduate programs and the corresponding changes in student 
perspectives about the role of education in general is a serious 
factor that deserves much more attention.    
The value of liberal arts education lies precisely in its non-
utilitarian purpose.  “The essential paradox, or one might even 
say the miracle of liberal education,” Nicholas Lemann writes in 
his essay about the relation between liberal arts and professional 
education, “is that by being evidently impractical, it equips a stu-
dent for life far more richly and completely, and across a far wider 
expanse of time and space, than does education whose sole aim is 
to be useful.”80  “Liberal education,” he explains,  
is best defined with its most literal meaning: It is education 
that liberates, that frees the mind from the constraints of a 
particular moment and set of circumstances, that permits 
one to see the possibilities that are not immediately appar-
ent, to understand things in a larger context, to think about 
situations conceptually and analytically, to draw upon a 
base of master knowledge when faced with specific situa-
tions.81   
Arguing that professional schools fit well within liberal arts uni-
versities, Lemann writes, “there is, or should be, a big difference 
between job training and professional education.  The reason that 
liberal education and professionals make for a potentially good fit 
is because they have crucially in common a transcendent quality, 
  
 78. Brint et al., supra n. 72, at 159. 
 79. Grubb & Lazerson, supra n. 74, at 9. 
 80. Nicholas Lemann, Liberal Education and Professionals, 90 Liberal Educ. 14 
(Spring 2004) (available at http://www.aacu.org/liberaleducation/le-sp04/le-sp04feature1 
.cfm). 
 81. Id. 
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a commitment to a broad and not necessarily utilitarian perspec-
tive.”82  He then describes three positive attributes of a successful 
professional program: First,  
[a] professional school should not strive to be a miniature-in-
entire of the professional workplace itself; rather, it should 
teach what the profession cannot.  That is likely to be ‘liber-
al’ material, meaning material that induces long-term un-
derstanding, reflection—even wisdom.83   
Second, professional schools should develop their own version of a 
liberal university’s research faculty, and, third, a professional 
school “should be a creator and upholder of standards for profes-
sional conduct that may seem unrealistic to practitioners who are 
caught up in the pressures of daily work in the field.”84       
The Report appears to embrace this view by citing Lemann’s 
essay with approval:  
[R]ecovering the formative dimension of professional educa-
tion for the law lies in forging more connections with the 
arts and sciences in the larger academic context [and in] en-
gag[ing] the larger academy around the perennial themes of 
liberal education, particularly focused on the formation of a 
life of the mind for practice.85   
However, while the Report strongly agrees with Lemann that the 
value of liberal arts education and its value to professional educa-
tion lies precisely in its non-utilitarian perspective, the Report 
responds by urging, or at least appearing to urge, a more utilitar-
ian approach in law schools: “It is difficult to imagine a stronger 
emphasis on formation that does not also require schools to place 
more relative weight on preparation for practice . . . .”86  Thus the 
Report sets up a structural tension between two of its central 
themes: (1) the importance of apprenticeship with the stress on 
clinical and other practical forms of preparation; and (2) the cen-
trality of professional ethics as something resisting the reduction 
  
 82. Id. at 15. 
 83. Id. at 16–17. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 32. 
 86. Id. at 33. 
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of law to practical concerns.  At best, the Report assumes with 
hardly any analytical discussion that clinical and other practical 
preparation in legal education will be congruent with the centrali-
ty of legal ethics.  At worst, the Report appears to dilute its com-
mitment to the centrality of legal ethics by stressing various 
forms of practical preparation. 
The Report attempts to resolve this apparent tension by de-
scribing the concept of “apprenticeship” in theoretical terms, not 
in the traditional sense of an actual apprenticeship with a practi-
tioner, but as a metaphor for the various dimensions of profes-
sional education.  But the Report is clearly focused on adding clin-
ics and simulated practice to the law school curriculum.  Even 
during the first year of legal education, the Report calls for inte-
gration of simulation exercises on the assumption that a greater 
focus on practical skills will “humanize” the process and thus lead 
students to a heightened sense of ethical and moral identity.87 
There is very little evidence, however, to support this as-
sumption.  One article cited by the Report describes positive 
changes in “moral reasoning” in students who participated in an 
ethics course designed with a “student centered” experiential ap-
proach.88  But that study used an approach to measuring “moral 
reasoning” that is highly controversial, and it only measured 
changes in student responses taken immediately before the 
course and shortly after.89  Further, the study’s author acknowl-
edges that there is no evidence that his measurements predict 
future ethical behavior, and he did not study the impact on moral 
development in clinical courses.90  Another article cited in the Re-
port, using the same controversial methods, suggests that legal 
education has no significant impact on moral development of its 
students.91 
  
 87. Id. at 33–42, 77–84. 
 88. Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development through Experiential Teaching, 1 
Clin. L. Rev. 505, 533 (1995). Hartwell’s study relies on Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of 
moral reasoning and development, which, as Hartwell acknowledges, has been criticized 
for confusing moral development with acceptance of “western liberal thinking.”  Id. at 512. 
 89. Id. at 526. 
 90. Id. at 533–535. 
 91. Maury Landsman & Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students across 
Three Years: Influences of Gender, Political Ideology and Interest in Altruistic Practice, 45 
S. Tex. L. Rev. 891, 914 (2004). 
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Despite the lack of directly supporting data, the Report ar-
gues for moral development as a goal in legal education.  The Re-
port cites studies indicating there is still room for moral develop-
ment in law students and argues that the available research does 
not at least foreclose the possibility of moral development in law 
school:  
[L]ike moral judgment, moral identity is not established 
once and for all in childhood.  It can be transformed quite 
dramatically in adulthood when individuals encounter con-
ditions that are conducive to further growth.  A number of 
studies have shown that moral identity and ethical commit-
ment can change quite dramatically well into adulthood.92 
However, by ignoring the significant changes in students’ ed-
ucational experiences before law school and by its persistent em-
phasis on practical training, the Report may have encouraged law 
schools to implement reforms that focus on only one of the three 
apprenticeships—the practical.93  The Report, in other words, may 
have inadvertently encouraged reforms that risk aggravating the 
same problems it intends to address.  At least one critic, for in-
stance, criticizes the Report for being anti-intellectual:  
[The Carnegie Report] is a political tract, a polemic on legal 
education.  It is an offensive attack against the intellectual 
tradition in legal education.  Though its authors, and those 
who embrace it, would reject this characterization, it advo-
cates a return to the anti-intellectual tradition of legal edu-
cation: “law school as apprenticeship to the profession of 
law.”94   
The Report, Professor Long argues, appears to embrace an al-
ready disturbing trend, “the creation of many competent practi-
tioners perhaps, but few of whom are well-educated, well-
rounded, and intellectually curious lawyers (and human be-
ings).”95  
  
 92. Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 134–135 (citation omitted). 
 93. See supra nn. 3, 4, and accompanying text.  
 94. Long, supra n. 2, at 20 (quoting Carnegie Report, supra n. 1, at 3). 
 95. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
File: Yates Article 9-9-11.docx Created on:  9/9/2011 2:41:00 PM Last Printed: 9/9/2011 4:07:00 PM 
248 The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute [Vol. 17 
As Professor Long acknowledges, the authors of the Report 
would reject his characterization of their approach as anti-
intellectual.96  But even if it was not the Report’s intent to advo-
cate a utilitarian approach to legal education, the Report has at 
least provided law schools with a rationalization for embracing a 
mostly practice-oriented focus.  This unfortunate trend is even 
further amplified by pressures resulting from changes in the pro-
fession itself, which I turn to in the next part. 
III. AFTER GRADUATION: THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES OF 
ACTUAL PRACTICE 
For the past two or three decades, legal scholars have docu-
mented and criticized the increasing focus on profit motivations in 
the practice of law and the resulting ethical crisis within the pro-
fession.97  Even in a good economy, new associates at corporate 
law firms face almost immediate pressure to generate profits for 
their employers.98  In the current economy, things are even 
worse.99  The rising cost of legal education combined with a 
shrinking market for legal services has created even more pres-
sure on recent graduates to earn high salaries.100  The corporate 
firms that pay those salaries feel similar pressures.101  Incidents 
of ethical violations resulting in professional discipline and even 
criminal prosecution are on the rise.102  Faced with declining prof-
it margins, firms have been accused of “overworking files” and 
overstaffing projects in an effort to increase billable hours.103  And 
they have bent the rules governing conflicts of interest.104  One 
survey indicated that one-third of the 30,000 clients interviewed 
  
 96. Id. at 20. 
 97. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 
(Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press 1993). 
 98. Id. at 302; see also Steven Harper, Law School Deception, AM L. Daily (Jan. 14, 
2011) (available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/01/harperdeception 
.html). 
 99. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game? N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 2011) (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html?_r=1). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Harper, supra n. 98. 
 102. Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism, 100 Dick. L. Rev. 515, 518 
(1996). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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felt dissatisfied with the representation they received from their 
attorneys, citing primarily a failure to communicate and inade-
quate attention given to their cases, suggesting that law firms are 
under pressure to increase their case loads without hiring new 
associates to staff them.105  The recent decline in professionalism 
is even further evidenced by a decline in pro bono commitment.106  
Thus, new graduates face even heavier workloads, increased 
pressure to meet high billable requirements, and fewer pro bono 
opportunities. 
These pressures have affected legal education as well.  In ad-
dition to attempting to attract employers who want greater prof-
itability from their new hires, law schools now also have to mar-
ket themselves to students worried about high debt and low em-
ployment.107  As discussed above, law school reforms have mostly 
focused on preparing students for “practice,” without engaging in 
a discussion of what that means.  It would appear that law 
schools are mostly using the Carnegie Report as a justification for 
what is really a response to market pressures squeezing law 
schools at both the entry and the exit level.  The soaring cost of 
legal education combined with the shrinking market for law 
school graduates has resulted in increased competition for quali-
fied students and increased pressure to “sell” them to law firms, 
who, enjoying a buyers’ market, demand more value—and thus 
less need for extensive training—in their new hires.      
The market forces discussed above also reflect a deeper con-
flict over the lawyer’s role in modern society.  Professor Gillian 
Hadfield distinguishes two different functions now served by the 
legal profession.108  The first is the “democratic/political function,” 
which involves “protecting the architecture of democratic institu-
tions, protecting individual rights, implementing the balance of 
power that promotes the normative goals of self-governance such 
as human dignity, autonomy, fairness and well being.”109  This 
  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Segal, supra n. 99 (responding to bad press and a poor economy, law schools 
feel more pressure to offer economic justifications for a law degree). 
 108. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Cost of Professional 
Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1689, 1705 (2008). 
 109. Id. at 1702. 
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represents Justice Brandeis’s ideal of the “lawyer-statesman.”110  
In its stress on the lawyer’s ethical duty to society as a whole, the 
Carnegie Report embraces this ideal.111  Hadfield contrasts the 
other role of the law as “supporting efficient market transactions: 
establishing real and intellectual property rights, and facilitating 
contractual and organizational economic relationships in finance, 
innovation, production, and trade.”112  In this later function, Had-
field comments, “law is more appropriately judged not by how 
well it promotes the normative democratic goals of equality, au-
tonomy, dignity and so on but rather how well it promotes eco-
nomic activity and efficiency.”113  Because the “lawyer-statesman” 
function of the law has traditionally been seen as the primary if 
not sole model for the legal profession, the growth of the law’s 
commercial function is regarded as a threat to the profession’s 
core values: “So we see the commercialization of law,” she writes, 
“as a struggle to keep the impressive tide of market incentives 
from swamping fidelity to ‘the’ profession’s ‘core values’ of protect-
ing individual rights and democratic goals.”114  
Hadfield’s solution to this conflict is to “cut the ties between 
the two functions,” and “begin to build differentiated legal profes-
sions that are not dragged under, in either sphere, by the weight 
of the other.”115  For Hadfield, the problem with failing to recog-
nize these two very different functions is that regulation of the 
legal profession focuses primarily on the traditional role of legal 
practice in a way that harms them both.  On the one hand, pro-
fessional rules of conduct are designed to preserve the traditional 
vision, but, on the other hand, those rules are created by regula-
tory bodies dominated by corporate practitioners.  Thus, in the 
field of traditional practice, regulations are inadequate because 
they tend to be less about ethics and more about the preservation 
of exclusivity of practice and the financial interests of lawyers, 
  
 110. Id. at 1703. For recent discussions of lawyers as “public citizens,” see W. Taylor 
Reveley, The Citizen Lawyer, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1309 (2009), and Deborah L. Rhode, 
Lawyers as Citizens, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev 1323 (2009).  
 111. Supra pt. I. 
 112. Hadfield, supra n. 108, at 1702. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1705. 
 115. Id. 
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while, in the field of corporate practice, the rules stifle innovation 
and needlessly increase costs:  
[t]he financial interests of lawyers should be reined in where 
access to legal services is necessary to protect democratic in-
terests rooted in our normative goals of equality, dignity, 
fairness, and individual well being . . . . But where the inter-
ests at stake are the profit-making endeavors of entities, our 
primary concern in the design of regulation should be the ef-
ficiency of legal markets and their capacity to promote the 
efficiency of other markets.116 
Professor Hadfield’s concerns are focused on regulatory re-
form, but her observations are applicable to reforms in legal edu-
cation as well.  Her view of the role of lawyers in the corporate 
world corresponds with the Carnegie Report’s view of the “legal 
machine” described in the first chapter, except that she calls for 
more focus on practical skills, not to “humanize” the process, but 
to increase efficiency and to reduce the homogeneity of legal skills 
that dominates the practice of law and, she argues, stifles innova-
tion.117  In a sense, she embraces the role of lawyers—at least for 
those who serve corporate interests—that the Report seeks to re-
form.  And law schools, ironically, seem to be moving in that di-
rection as well, and they are doing it even as they claim to be re-
sponding to the Report’s call for change.  
Although the Carnegie Report acknowledges economic pres-
sures and their impact on the legal profession, it fails to consider 
the very different roles played by lawyers who serve individual 
interests versus those who serve financial entities. It is hard, for 
instance, to understand how “humanizing” legal education by 
adding context to the Socratic discussion of cases during the first 
year will have any real significance for graduates whose careers 
will be devoted to representing the interests of corporate entities 
whose goal is simply to maximize profits.118  To be sure, the Re-
port calls for more than just that, but by emphasizing apprentice-
  
 116. Id. at 1730. 
 117. Id. at 1722. 
 118. I do not mean to suggest that there is no room or need for ethics in corporate prac-
tice.  My point is only that not all lawyers represent individuals seeking justice in the 
political sense and that humanizing law school may not account for all the realities of 
actual practice. 
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ship and practical training while giving inadequate attention to 
the demands of actual practice in a complex economy, the Report 
may have the unfortunate effect of contributing to the already 
disturbing trend in legal education toward purely economic objec-
tives.                     
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Carnegie Report urges law schools to engage in innova-
tion and self-assessment.  These are indeed important and lauda-
ble processes, but they are not ends in themselves and should not 
be undertaken without careful consideration of the goals they are 
intended to serve.  Law schools are facing difficult and challeng-
ing questions about the role they should play and the impact they 
should seek to have in an increasingly complex and economically 
charged professional environment.  Thus, in responding to the 
Carnegie Report, law schools should start by engaging in a critical 
examination of the Report itself and then consider, first, whether 
they agree that legal education should play a significant role in 
defining the profession, and second, if they do agree on that point, 
what it means to be “prepared” for the practice of law.  
The discussion could be framed according to three alterna-
tives.  First, law schools might consciously embrace a purely utili-
tarian approach.  Law schools choosing that direction would de-
sign their program to subordinate theory to practical training.  
Those programs would feature, for instance, clinical programs—
as electives or even core requirements—externships, classes on 
negotiation, contract drafting, discovery, and trial advocacy.  
Choosing this approach would amount to at least a tacit admis-
sion that legal education does not define practice, it simply re-
sponds to the demands of market forces.  This option for legal ed-
ucation embraces the Carnegie Report’s concept of apprenticeship, 
but the “cognitive” and “practical” apprenticeships are strongly 
emphasized over the apprenticeship of “identity” or purpose.   
A second alternative would be to fully embrace the Carnegie 
Report’s vision of the lawyer as defender of social and political 
justice.  Choosing this approach, however, would require much 
more radical changes than those urged in the Report.  Law 
schools would have to design their programs in light of the signif-
icant changes in undergraduate education and the effect those 
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developments have had on the expectations of the students they 
admit.  Law schools would also have to account for the very real 
economic pressures students now face upon entering the profes-
sion after graduation.  This option for law schools would see pro-
fessional education as more than just vocational training and 
thus would emphasize non-utilitarian courses at least as much as 
those that teach practical skills.  For example, courses on legal 
theory, jurisprudence, history, and even literature would be fea-
tured as prominently as clinical training, simulation, and other 
skills-based courses.  Further, rather than simply hoping that 
adding context and humanizing the process will impact the ethi-
cal development of their adult students, law schools would active-
ly focus at the admissions level on attracting students who have 
already made some progress in establishing the kind of profes-
sional identity the school seeks to promote.  This could be accom-
plished, at least in part, by considering, as a significant factor in 
admissions decisions, college transcripts that indicate a view of 
education as a form of personal (not just economic) development. 
The school’s promotional materials should encourage students to 
address that point in their personal essays.  In addition, such law 
schools should develop “pipeline” programs designed to reach stu-
dents before they get to law school.  These types of programs 
could have a significant impact on the education and personal 
development of students in a way that creates a more solid foun-
dation for later professional and ethical training.  Obviously, 
there are many possibilities, but the point here is that law schools 
choosing to commit to the Carnegie Report’s call for a conscious 
focus on the development of ethical identity would need to do 
much more than simply add clinical education, simulation, and 
skills training.     
A third alternative would be to design a hybrid program 
based on Professor Hadfield’s notion of the two distinct functions 
of the modern legal profession.  Under this option, a law school 
might offer two separate tracks, each with different requirements.  
One track would emphasize public interest and the traditional 
view of the lawyer as defender of political and social justice, while 
the other track would focus on a lawyer’s role in facilitating busi-
ness and corporate interests.  Students choosing the latter ap-
proach would take required classes that emphasize practical 
skills, but that also focus on innovation.  Externships and clinics 
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in this type of program might partner with corporate law firms as 
well as with the business community served by those firms.  Pro-
fessional responsibility courses would be designed to examine how 
the profession is regulated, how it is defined by regulations, and 
how new approaches might better serve the goal of economic effi-
ciency.  Offering two tracks at a law school has the advantage of 
attracting students who self-select a program with clearly defined 
goals and who are thus more likely to respond to the pedagogical 
purposes underlying each of the two tracks. 
Sadly, most law schools have not made clear the model of pro-
fessional identity for which that are preparing their students.  An 
increasing number of law schools appear to have tacitly adopted a 
program of instruction that corresponds to the first alternative 
(the utilitarian approach) outlined above.  In such programs, law 
schools seek to attract students by touting programs that promise 
clinical and “real world” experience and then sell those students 
to employers by promising better value in their new associates.  
Fostering a sense of professional identity understood in ethical 
and moral terms has not been a significant selling point to either 
practically-minded students or their future employers.  As I have 
discussed, the Carnegie Report persistently emphasizes the con-
cept of apprenticeship, but fails to consider adequately how 
changes in undergraduate education have impacted the attitudes 
of students entering law school and how changes in the legal pro-
fession have affected what law students will encounter after 
graduation.  Ironically, the Report has thus unintentionally pro-
vided law schools with a rationalization to move toward purely 
economic objectives, and has contributed to the very problems it 
was intended to address. 
 
